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Abstract
Current societies are configured in such a way that relations with others are less defined and social conditions are complex and often 
nontransparent (e.g. Holmes, 2015; Bauman, 2003). There is never-ending uncertainty over how to act and how to feel. Set rules on 
how to feel no longer exist (Hochschild, 1983; Neckel, 2005; Wouters, 1999). These conditions also pose a challenge in migration 
processes: clear demarcations and unwavering sense of belonging are often not possible “just like that” (Albrecht, 2016, p. 1). This 
implies challenges for the individual. To this effect, emotions become increasingly important in navigating one’s own path through 
uncertain conditions (Holmes, 2015). The following paper addresses how emotional reflexivity processes are relevant for individuals 
in these situations. As such, emotional reflexivity must be defined as a process of internal adjustment between emotional activity 
and emotional passivity. The result of this process is visible through a level of action which can also consist in taking no action at all 
(Helfferich, 2012). Therefore, the paper suggests a modified definition of the terms agency and “emotional reflexivity”. The definition 
of emotional reflexivity includes several aspects of Holmes’s (2015; 2010) and Burkitt’s (2012) former definitions and expands on 
them. Emotional reflexivity – internal adjustments of emotional activity and passivity – will be illustrated using empirical data on 
current processes of migration to Germany. 
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Reflexividad emocional en los procesos de migración  
La necesidad de considerar los procesos internos  
para explicar la agencia 
Resumen
Las sociedades actuales están configuradas de tal modo que las relaciones con los demás están menos definidas y las condiciones so-
ciales son complejas y a menudo no transparentes (por ejemplo, Holmes, 2015; Bauman, 2003). Siempre hay una gran incertidumbre 
sobre cómo actuar y sentir. Ya no hay reglas establecidas sobre cómo hemos de sentirnos (Hochschild, 1983; Neckel, 2005; Wouters, 
1999). Estas condiciones también plantean un reto para los procesos migratorios: las demarcaciones claras y la sensación inequívoca 
de pertenencia ya no son posibles «sin más» (Albrecht, 2016, pág. 1). Esto implica una serie de retos para el individuo. En este senti-
do, las emociones son cada vez más importantes a la hora de seguir nuestro propio camino en condiciones inciertas (Holmes, 2015). 
El siguiente artículo analiza la importancia de los procesos de reflexividad emocional para las personas que se encuentran en estas 
situaciones. Como tal, la reflexividad emocional debe definirse como un proceso de ajuste interno entre la actividad emocional y la 
pasividad emocional. El resultado de este proceso es visible por medio de un nivel de acción que también consiste en no emprender 
ninguna acción (Helfferich, 2012). Por lo tanto, este artículo sugiere un cambio de definición de los términos agencia y reflexividad 
emocional. La definición de reflexividad emocional incluye y amplía varios aspectos de las definiciones previas de Holmes (2015; 
2010) y Burkitt (2012). La reflexividad emocional —los ajustes internos de la actividad y la pasividad emocionales— se ilustra me-
diante datos empíricos sobre los procesos actuales de migración en Alemania. 
Palabras clave
reflexividad emocional, agencia, migración, emoción
1.  Introduction: The problem of  
navigating one’s own path through 
uncertain conditions 
Living today means living in a state of uncertainty (Bauman, 2003, 
p. 7). Rules – especially those governing feelings, which guide 
individuals on how to react in the face of social expectations 
(Hochschild, 1983; Wouters, 1999; Neckel, 2005) – are not given 
self-evidently anymore. In today’s societies there are many frames 
of orientation which partly contradict each other. That poses new 
challenges for the individual – especially in migration contexts. 
Clear demarcations and unwavering feelings of belonging are 
often not possible “just like that” (Albrecht, 2016). Hence, dealing 
with ambivalence is one of the main challenges in migration 
processes (Amelina, 2013, p. 145). Therefore, cognitive or 
rational control – practiced by doing emotion work (Hochschild, 
1983) – is not the only pertinent mechanism. Emotions become 
more and more important for navigating one’s own path through 
uncertain conditions (Holmes, 2015, p. 61). The thesis of this 
paper states that, in facing these social developments, emotional 
reflexivity must be called upon to handle increasing ambivalences, 
uncertainty and fluidity (Bauman, 2003; see also Kleres and 
Albrecht, 2015). Particularly in contexts of migration, emotional 
reflexivity processes are a way of dealing with experiences of racism 
and facing demands to assimilate under the efficiency imperative 
of the arrival context. As migrants tackle these challenges, 
emotional reflexivity processes become ever more visible in their 
narrations. These processes consist in balancing emotional activity 
and emotional passivity. In other words, emotions are cognitively 
influenced – which can also be described as a kind of emotion work 
(Hochschild, 1983) – or circumstances of passivity are created in 
which emotions can arise on their own. This is made possible with 
the support of spiritual-religious interpretation frameworks and 
rituals which have been carried over from the context of origin.
To illustrate the relevance of emotional reflexivity processes in 
aspects of agency in the context of migration, firstly, I would like 
to introduce the concept of emotional reflexivity developed by Ian 
Burkitt (2012) and Mary Holmes (2015; 2010). In this context, 
it is also relevant to describe more precisely how emotions can 
be defined. Many definitions of emotions, feelings and affects 
currently exist (e.g. Reckwitz 2015; Scherke, 2009; Flam, 2002; 
Gerhards, 1988). In this paper, I will discuss the definition of 
emotions provided by the American sociologist Jack Katz (1999). 
Using this definition to look at the concept of emotional reflexivity 
has proven to be very fruitful and continuative, as we will see. 
In combining the concept of emotional reflexivity with Katz’ 
concept of emotions, I suggest a modification of already existing 
definitions of the former. I define emotional reflexivity as a process 
of adjusting or balancing emotional passivity and emotional 
activity and as an internal practice which can have effects on a 
level of action, but does not have to. My suggested definition 
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bases itself on aspects of Burkitt’s (2012) and Holmes’s (2015; 
2010) definitions, expanding on them. 
Finally, I will illustrate this new expanded definition of 
emotional reflexivity through empirical data (see also Albrecht, 
2017; Albrecht, 2016; Albrecht, 2015). This data will show how 
emotional reflexivity is undertaken in current processes of migration 
to Germany. Through in-depth interviews in which individuals tell 
their life stories, these emotional reflexivity processes become 
apparent. The aim of telling the entire story (Schütze, 1983) is to 
allow those interviewed to talk, almost automatically, about their 
internal dialogues, which can be defined as a dialogue between 
“I” and “Me”, according to George Herbert Mead (1973).
I will show that internal processes lead to different outcomes in 
terms of the level of action: emotional activity can lead to passivity 
on an action level, and the other way around. Hence, an expanded 
definition of the concept of agency becomes necessary, one that 
also includes passivity and which also allows for internal processes 
of emotional reflexivity. Adoption of the term “emotional reflexive 
agency” in future research is suggested.
2. The concept of emotional reflexivity 
In the current social context, situations can be complex, varied 
and ambivalent. This reality also implies emotional challenges for 
the individual. The American sociologist and constructivist Arlie 
Russell Hochschild (1983, p.190) postulated that there exist feeling 
rules in society which regulate appropriate emotional behavior. 
By relating to these feeling rules – according to the constructivist 
approach (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1980) of emotions – the 
individual is able to modify their own feelings. Hochschild (1983) 
developed the concept of emotion work, which encompasses all 
inner and outer efforts, practices and subjective strategies aimed at 
shaping or adapting emotions – both in one’s private and working 
life (Neckel, 1983, p. 15). Based on this point of view, people 
are able to change their emotions. The modification of emotions 
in accordance with social expectations takes place primarily in a 
cognitively induced way. Emotion work is therefore an active and 
strategic way of influencing what people feel. It is a cognitive skill 
which is learned and employed to control feelings in accordance 
with situated norms (see also Rastetter, 1999, p. 379f.)
However, there is also criticism of the concept of feeling rules in 
its final interpretation. Holmes (2015, p. 61) and Wouters (1999) 
point out that, given the new complexity of contemporary societies 
and especially the new situations, feeling rules are no longer clear. 
Social conditions are much more complex than in latter days 
(Holmes, 2015, p. 61). According to Holmes (2015), rather than 
doing emotion work to fit in with static feeling rules, emotional 
reflexivity is necessary to determine what to feel. And being able 
to determine what to feel on your own is necessary to navigate 
in a world of plurality, fluidity and flexibility (e.g. Bauman, 2003).
In addition, Cas Wouters (1999) has stated that manners and 
feeling rules have become informal – especially since the 1960s 
and 1970s. Manners and customs are now more flexible and 
less formal, not to mention more subtly nuanced. Furthermore, 
relations with others have become less well-defined and more 
diverse. Referring to Norbert Elias (1976; 1983), Wouters points 
out that many people are nevertheless under the impression that 
behavior and emotions must be more controlled. As the scale of 
socially accepted variations has grown, they have had to start 
differentiating their behavior and their emotions (Wouters, 1999, 
p. 53). Therefore, the more differentiated the control of emotions, 
the more variations that have appeared – they are part and parcel 
of the same process. The social spectrum of acceptable behavior 
and emotions may indeed have become more nuanced, but that 
does not mean it is any less important how someone behaves. 
Manners have become, in fact, more important, simply less clearly 
defined (Wouters, 1999, p. 54).
Under these circumstances – when feeling rules and norms are 
often no longer clearly defined, however it is still important how 
to act and to feel – cognitive influencing is not the only mechanism 
the individual needs in these diverse situations. To control yourself 
and your emotions cognitively, rationally, you must know in 
which way or according to what rules they should be controlled. 
However, what happens if those clearly defined rules and norms 
can no longer be found? Referring to this lack of determination 
of norms and rules, Holmes (2015, p. 61) points out that, under 
these conditions, emotional reflexivity is increasingly necessary 
for people drawing on emotions to navigate their own path. 
How exactly can emotional reflexivity be defined? According 
to Holmes (2010) and Burkitt (2012), the term remains partially 
unclear: emotional reflexivity is a process which is not only 
cognitively induced but also embodied and relational. Thus, 
emotional reflexivity seems to include both cognitive aspects 
and processes which are embodied. Therefore, emotional 
reflexivity is more than emotion work, which is only cognitively 
induced (Hochschild, 1983). “Emotional reflexivity here appears 
as different to individual emotion work or labor exercised in 
relation to feeling rules […]” (Holmes, 2010, p. 63). Nevertheless, 
emotional reflexivity is still something active, but it is less cognitive 
than emotion work. The body is explicitly involved in the definition 
of emotional reflexivity. 
In addition, Holmes states: “Emotional reflexivity refers to the 
intersubjective interpretation of one’s own and others’ emotions 
and how they are enacted” (Holmes, 2015, p. 61). That means 
that emotional reflexivity is about reflecting and acting in response 
to one’s own feelings and to the feelings of other people (Holmes, 
2010). According to this, the individual also refers to the norms 
and interpretations of others in processes of emotional reflexivity. 
Holmes and Burkitt see emotional reflexivity as practice, something 
which becomes obvious in interactions with others and something 
which cannot be exercised in isolation. In that way, emotional 
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reflexivity is a capacity, something that people are able to do 
while interacting with others. 
To sum up: according to Burkitt and Holmes, emotional 
reflexivity is a practice which is more flexible than emotion work, 
which only implies assimilating one’s own feelings based on social 
expectations. Emotional reflexivity, meanwhile, is something 
active, something which is done – but they are vague about what 
this activity exactly entails. What does it mean that emotional 
reflexivity is a practice which becomes obvious in interactions 
with others? Is it something that we do – like playing soccer or 
kissing someone? 
Furthermore, they state that emotional reflexivity is not only 
cognitively induced but also embodied, but the bodily dimension 
is quite nebulous in this definition. Neither Burkitt nor Holmes 
specifies how the embodied components are involved in processes 
of emotional reflexivity. This will be embellished on further in the 
next section, when discussing the approach of Jack Katz. 
According to Burkitt and Holmes, emotional reflexivity is a 
capacity, but it is unclear how this capacity is expressed. In what 
kind of activity does this capacity consist? If emotional reflexivity is 
a capacity, then what characteristics or features must the individual 
possess in order to exercise it?
I suggest building the concept of emotional reflexivity on 
the concept of practice but defining it as an internal practice 
which is interwoven inextricably with agency – with the 
possibility and ability to act (Helfferich, 2012, p.15). Without a 
process of emotional reflexivity – and the result of this process is 
undetermined – people are not able to act in any way. I propose 
understanding emotional reflexivity as an internal practice which 
can be caused by concrete interactions with others – but does not 
have to be. In addition, the imagining of norms or reactions can 
lead to processes of emotional reflexivity. The results of emotional 
reflexivity processes can – but do not have to – have effects on an 
action level. They can also include the decision not to act at all, 
which can be defined as passivity, which is in fact a special kind 
of agency (Helfferich, 2012).
In this expanded definition, the internal practice of emotional 
reflexivity consists of a process of adjustment or balance between 
emotional passivity and emotional activity. And this balancing is 
the “doing” of the individual in which different aspects of identity 
and society – you could define them as “I” and “Me”, according 
to Mead (1973) – are negotiated in internal dialogues. The result 
of these internal practices can be manifested as specific action. 
However, in cases of passivity in regard to action level, people 
can talk about their emotional reflexivity processes. Furthermore, 
passivity can also be observed. Emotional reflexivity processes 
can become apparent in bodily reactions. According to Reckwitz 
(2008, p. 151), a practice is a kind of ensemble of linked and 
regular activities of the body, which are held together by shared 
 1.  Reckwitz (2015) writes about affects but it is also correct for the term “emotion”.
forms of understanding and knowledge. They also might be 
implicit and can be understood as a cultural framework. 
Because of the plurality of social demands and expectations, 
it is not possible to make the fulfillment of social expectations 
the ultimate goal. It is necessary to differentiate, to evaluate and 
to reflect on what is important. Due to the lack of well-defined 
rules and norms, the individual is its only trustworthy point 
of reference. Immersed in this insecurity, the only stronghold 
available is the individual and their emotions. Hence, it is 
immensely important to figure out what a person feels. But what 
are feelings or emotions? 
3.  Emotions as contemporaneity of action 
and something that befalls and  
the process of emotional reflexivity  
as their mediation
The American sociologist Jack Katz (1999) does not differentiate 
between emotions and feelings. According to Reckwitz1 (2015, p. 
29f.) and Dewey (2007), emotions must always be conceptualized 
in a duality of material embodiment and cultural framework. That 
means that emotions are parts of the body and they are framed 
within cultural-symbolic interpretations. These processes cannot be 
described separately; they are always linked to each other. Hence, 
we are not able to recognize embodied emotional phenomenon 
without framing them by language. Therefore, it is important 
to analyze how individual-embodied and sociocultural processes 
are linked to each other. The dual character of materiality and 
culturality highlights the special place emotions hold in sociality 
(see Reckwitz on affects, 2015, p. 29f.). 
This mirrors the concept of identity developed by George 
Herbert Mead (1973). He differentiates the self into “I” and “Me” 
– parts of an identity which are continuously in internal dialogue 
with each other. The “I” is the impulsive, body-based part of the 
identity, while the “Me” encompasses the roles and internalized 
expectations of others, that is, the social conditions which must be 
brought in line with the demands of the impulsive “I”. The result 
of the invisible dialogue between “I” and “Me” is the self, which 
is visible in interactions (Abels, 2010) and expressed through the 
emotions that arise from this interaction between the spontaneous 
and creative “I” and the reflexive “Me” (Dietz, 2012, p. 39).
Jack Katz understands emotions as processual, creative and 
embodied. He defines emotions as self-reflexive actions and 
experiences, emphasizing that emotions are not active or passive 
phenomena, but rather both at the same time (Knoblauch, 2015). 
While having feelings, the individual simultaneously becomes 
subject and object. Katz asks: How does a smile happen to a person 
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and how is it done by a person at the same time (Knoblauch, 2015, 
p. 9)? That is, Katz (1999) was interested in questioning how 
the impulse of laughing is at once sensed by individuals as well 
as shaped and influenced (see also Plessner, 1961). The result is 
the expression of laughter. Emotions are the contemporaneity of 
passivity and activity. Emotions can be experienced and consist of 
actions which refer to the self, in other words, are self-reflective. 
Katz argues that spontaneous expressions not only befall us; we 
produce them in artful ways (Dietz, 2012, p. 31). That is, emotions 
befall us and are practiced actively by us at the same time. I would 
go so far to say that they are mediated and balanced in internal 
processes of emotional reflexivity. Therefore, emotional reflexivity 
is part of the emotion itself. 
From Katz’s (1999) point of view, emotions are characterized 
by three parallel processes. Firstly, there is the transformation of 
the body as medium and carrier of feelings. These transformations 
are understood as sensual metamorphoses. They are the psycho-
physical actions (Dewey, 2007, p.170) which are antecedent but 
always named and thus also always social. However, if people act 
and experience emotionally, these processes are always connected 
with real transformations of the body, for example, blushing when 
someone is ashamed. There exist transformations of the body 
which cannot be influenced cognitively and are therefore more 
than just people’s constructions (see also Plessner, 1961). And 
here lies the dimension of the experience of emotion, the more 
passive dimension (see also Albrecht, 2017, p. 84). This occurs, 
for example, when someone notices that he or she is blushing or 
is about to blush and intentionally tries to avoid it, with the only 
effect being that the blushing increases.
The second process which Katz mentions is the self-reflective 
interaction in which interpretations and social expectations of others 
can be considered. This is one of the active dimensions of emotions. 
How do individuals shape their own emotions by referring to the 
expectations of others? Alternative ways of acting are developed 
through a dialogue with the situation. Here is the space in which 
Hochschild’s (1983) emotion work can take place. The individual 
can try to modify their own emotions, for example, practicing deep 
acting or surface acting. While practicing deep acting, the person 
tries to modify their own “true” feelings.2 In the process of self-
reflection the individual comes to the conclusion that their feelings 
are not socially appropriate and wants to modify this cognitively. But 
the embodied feelings set limits to this procedure. The other way of 
acting, surface acting, involves faking emotions: only the expression 
of emotion is modified (Hochschild, 1983; Rastetter, 1999).
Thirdly, the narrative project of integrating situation-specific 
and situation-transcendental challenges in a narration is a 
 2.  Sighard Neckel (1983) criticized the terms “true” and “real” feelings because he emphasized the socially constructed character of every emotion. However, 
for the term “emotional reflexivity” it seems to be relevant to differentiate between modified and at least pre-modified feelings. That leads to the question 
of how sociology could adequately consider this pre-modified, more embodied dimension of emotions.
 3. Names have been changed.
characteristic of emotions (Dietz, 2012, p. 34). For Katz, narration 
is an important component of characterizing emotions. The 
function of this narration is a synthesis of heterogeneous elements 
(Ricoeur, 1988), a bringing together of previously different and 
disconnected elements. In this narration, gestures, words and 
images attempt to connect in a coherent way. Generating a 
narration is necessary for emotional acting because this is where 
the allocation of meaning takes place. In the dimension of 
meaning, aspects of the unconscious or preconscious as discussed 
by Sigmund Freud (1998; 1972) can also become important. 
But how can this definition of the concept of emotion help 
us to understand more precisely the concept of emotional 
reflexivity? Katz’s definition helps to specify the term emotional 
reflexivity in that it talks about emotions are both befalling and 
being practiced actively at the same time. Embodied processes 
and sociocultural framings are mediated at the same time. It is 
important not to ignore the embodied, more passive dimension 
of emotions – aspects which are often marginalized by sociology. 
It is not enough for future research to merely analyze the cultural 
frameworks that are used to try to achieve cognitively induced 
modification. The embodied parts must be taken as a sui generis 
reality, developing ideas of how to research more adequately this 
part of emotions. The interplay of the embodied part and the 
sociocultural framings must be analyzed. This is the emotional 
reflexivity process which I define as a process of adjustment or 
balancing between emotional passivity and emotional activity. The 
result of this process can be the specific action as well as taking no 
action at all. But how do emotional reflexivity processes become 
obvious in empirical material?
4.  Emotional reflexivity in migration 
processes
I will illustrate processes of emotional reflexivity through examples 
taken from my study of emotions in contexts of migration 
(Albrecht, 2017). In this chapter I will show that emotional 
reflexivity is an internal practice, a balancing process. This process 
of balancing – or adjustment between emotional passivity (“letting 
feelings happen”) and emotional activity (“influencing feelings 
cognitively”) – can lead to different results in terms of level of 
action. In the cases of Faysal,3 who migrated from Tunisia to 
Germany, and Caven, who migrated from Ethiopia to Germany, 
their internal process of balancing emotional activity and emotional 
passivity results in a decision to engage in emotion work as 
Hochschild (1983) discussed it. In the end, they decide to modify 
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their feelings, that is, influencing them in a cognitively induced 
way, referring to the expectations of others or to the requirements 
of an altered post-migration environment. Emotional reflexivity 
processes lead to changed forms of agency – to acceptance, in 
Faysal’s case, and in Caven’s, to passivity on an action level. 
The cases of Hayet and Lilia – who both migrated from Tunisia 
to Germany – are different. Hayet’s emotional passivity – the 
refusal to engage in emotion work based on the perception of 
different norms and ways of acting in the context of arrival to a 
new place – leads to opposition and communicated resistance. 
Lilia’s emotional passivity leads to passivity on an action level. 
In their processes of emotional reflexivity, spiritual-religious 
interpretation frameworks are relevant to the possible evocation 
of emotions. 
4.1.  Emotional activity (“influencing 
emotions cognitively”) leads to 
acceptance and to a change in action
Faysal, who migrated from Tunisia to Germany, speaks in his in-
depth interview about a situation he experienced with his daughter. 
This situation took place following his migration to Germany and 
illustrates how he designed his internal dialogues while dealing 
with problems in the context of arrival. In this special case, he 
had problems with the rainy weather in his new environment:
Faysal: “[…] eh here I try to be a little bit more realistic and, 
um, in the beginning I had problems with the weather, eh, 
yes, it is grey and I see the sun one time, I don‘t know. Yes, 
and I can remember, I went for a walk with my daughter, 
she was four years old, and she jumped and sang: ‘Oh, it 
is raining, it is beautiful!’. And I asked myself: ‘Man! How 
is this possible? The same environment, but for me, it is 
terrible, it is sad, so the color and cold and the rain.’ And 
then I thought: ‘Aha – what’s important is the attitude!’ And 
since then I have different feelings. [...] And if I stay here or, 
eh, have to stay here, then I have also to decide that I, what 
is my aim, to be happy and then my attitude towards the 
things, yes.” (Interview Faysal, Lines 114–131, highlighted 
text by the author)
The excerpt from Faysal’s interview shows his insight into his 
process of emotional reflexivity in the simultaneity of emotional 
passivity – the experience of his own feelings in that situation – and 
emotional activity (Katz, 1999) – the awareness that it could be 
different and that he might be able to do something cognitively 
to change his feelings. The situation with his daughter functions 
as a trigger for his internal dialogue: he recognizes that other 
 4.  In this case, a qualitative longitudinal section study could provide deeper insights.
feelings are possible, that he does not need to be controlled by 
circumstance. “Aha – what’s important is the attitude” – that is 
his moment of awareness in that situation.
If we base our reading of this emotional reflexivity process 
on Mead (1973), the internal practice could be defined as a 
negotiation between “I” and “Me”. The impulsive “I” is depressed 
because of the circumstances in the rainy environment, but when 
this is combined with possibly internalized expectations/role as 
father, Faysal recognizes the need to be happy. Though emotional 
reflexivity is a process of reflection, there is also the process of 
balancing one’s own feelings and the expectations of others or 
the requirements of the environment, which in Faysal’s case is 
triggered by the interaction with his daughter. The result of this 
process is a decision to have cognitive influence over his feelings, 
which Faysal describes as something he must do for himself: “If 
you want to be happy, you must do it yourself” – that is the 
interpretation which seems to work for Faysal. This can be looked 
at in a context of emotional self-management, which Hochschild 
(1983) described as emotion work, and in the context of the 
demands of current societal constellations: every person is the 
architect of his or her own fortune. Faysal decides that he wants to 
be happy and tries, cognitively induced to do so, to feel differently. 
Since this light-bulb moment with his daughter, he states that his 
feelings have changed. The rainy weather in the new environment 
no longer poses a problem; he goes for a walk no matter the skies. 
Because of his emotion work, he has enabled himself to accept 
the environmental differences between his context of departure 
and his context of arrival.
Hence, Faysal describes the effects of his cognitive emotional 
influencing as positive. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that according to Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983), emotion work 
could also have negative effects for the individual – especially 
in the long run. For instance, emotions could lose their signal-
function for the individual, which translates into a loss of valuable 
and important information. Furthermore, Hochschild sees the 
possibility of estrangement: if emotion work is practiced long-
term, people might lose a sense of their own selves. 
Regardless, Faysal describes the short-term effects of this 
influence over his feelings as positive and useful to him. This 
is congruent with Daniela Rastetter’s (1999)  differentiated 
perspective on emotion work. She postulated that modeling one’s 
own emotions could lead to estrangement but that it could also 
have empowering effects. In this regard, the result of Faysal’s 
emotional reflexivity process led him to engage in emotional 
management and as such he was able to develop a different – in 
his view, more positive – form of agency: he is now able to act, 
in this case, to go for a walk, and to accept the circumstances of 
the new environment.4
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4.2.  Emotional activity (“influencing 
emotions cognitively”) leads to 
acceptance and passivity in terms of 
action level
Caven, who migrated from Ethiopia to Germany, also talks in his 
in-depth interview about his own emotional reflexivity process, 
which led him to influence cognitively his emotions. Caven’s 
process of emotional reflexivity was triggered by discriminating 
and racist experiences with the German police:
Caven: “That‘s why if I have to drive to F.-city or something, 
I go to the station, I stood easily one time in my little corner 
waiting for the train, then they always came to me and asked 
me for my identification card – again and again. Ah, this was 
totally boring, every time (laughing). ‘What is actually weird 
or how am I acting?’ And then: ‘Okay, maybe it is my fault, so 
I have to change my behavior with the people.’ I didn‘t realize 
it yet, but I tried [...] I really tried to integrate.” (Interview 
Caven, Lines 95–119, highlighted text by the author)
Caven shares a story of institutional discrimination: because he 
is identified easily as a “foreigner”, he is a victim of control and 
exclusion. He emphasizes that this is not a one-time situation but 
rather the norm. As he narrates his internal dialogues, it becomes 
obvious that these interactions with people in institutional settings 
in Germany are what triggered his process of emotional reflexivity. 
He is aware of a problem, he states that social expectations and 
demands are apparently different to how he can portray himself 
or act. These racist discriminations (Terkessidis, 2004) have led him 
to think that it is he who has to change. What this transformation 
could look like is very unclear since the discrimination takes place 
because Caven is a person of color. In his interpretation, the need 
for transformation is linked with the discourse of integration: he 
sees it as being up to him to become integrated but he states that 
he has not been able to accomplish this yet.
Later in the interview, Caven talks about his way of coping 
with these difficulties in the context of arrival. This is the result 
of his emotional reflexivity process:
Caven: “Therefore: ‘Be strong!’ (laughing) – I said to myself. 
That‘s why, there were many things, for example, you go one 
time in term to the club, then you go there. ‘No, you can‘t come 
in!’ [...] because I‘m a foreigner, but also for this, I am prepared.” 
(Caven, Lines 799–801, highlighted text by the author)
The result of Caven’s emotional reflexivity process provides a very 
strong example of the power of circumstances, which provoke 
a cognitive influencing of his emotions. This can again be seen 
in the context of Hochschild’s (1983) concept of emotion work. 
Practicing emotion work becomes necessary for migrants dealing 
with racist interactions. In his internal dialogue, Caven asks himself 
to be strong, although this means not allowing weakness, which is 
linked with emotions such as sadness, anger or fear. He interprets 
being upset as a waste of time, so he prefers influencing his 
feelings; he tries to become still and to get his feelings under 
control. And he gives an explanation for doing so:
Caven: “Because I have the feeling, for the Germans, ‘no’ 
means ‘no’. That‘s why, why should I waste my time, because 
if you discuss it further, you can say something bad, how do 
you profit of this? [...] Not at all, before fighting or saying 
something, better go home and be quiet, [...] have it under 
control.” (Interview Caven, Lines 830–832)
The result of his process of emotional reflexivity, which could also 
be defined as a negotiation between “I” and “Me” according 
to Mead (1973), is the forced acceptance of socially derived 
norms and interpretations with effectiveness as the justification. 
Caven cannot see what he might stand to gain from a position 
of opposition, so he chooses to exert a cognitive influence over 
his emotions and in that way tries to stay calm. The result of 
his emotional reflexivity process is the possibility of accepting 
the stressful racist circumstances, being passive and having his 
own emotions under control. Caven is – compared with Faysal – 
confronted with different challenges in the context of arrival: he 
must deal with racist discrimination. These interactions trigger his 
process of emotional reflexivity. The result of this process is the 
same as in Faysal’s case: Caven decides to influence his feelings 
cognitively, to control them, and through this he creates for himself 
the possibility of not acting – a passivity which is merely a different 
kind of agency (Helfferich, 2012).
4.3.  Emotional passivity (“letting emotions 
arise”) leads to opposition against 
perceived norms and expectations  
in the context of arrival
In Hayet’s case her process of emotional reflexivity leads her to 
handle her emotions quite differently from Faysal and Caven. 
Hayet migrated from Tunisia to Germany with her husband, 
who found work in a German city. In her in-depth interview, she 
explains how she was very “modern” when she lived in Tunisia. 
She specified the word “modern” in her interview: while living 
in Tunisia she did not wear a scarf. However, when she arrived 
in Germany and experienced life in the context of arrival, she 
experienced a kind of “culture shock”:
Hayet: “When I came here, I said: ‘No, that is never anything 
for me. I don‘t want this to be like that!’ [...] Because it 
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is connected with virtue. Eh, eh, when I came here I went 
clubbing with my man, eh, because I wanted to explore this 
European lifestyle, and we were sometimes with groups of 
German people and women and men drank alcohol, very 
much alcohol, then they were different, they were without a 
standard, and that shocked me. [...] I didn‘t like this kind of 
life.” (Interview Hayet, Lines 271-290, highlighted text by 
the author)
Hayet’s process of emotional reflexivity is triggered by interactions 
with people from Germany: they drink alcohol and behave in 
a way which Hayet could not tolerate. As the others, she 
provides insights into her internal dialogue that could again be 
interpreted as the negotiation between “I” and “Me” referred 
to by Mead (1973): she observes social norms and roles in that 
specific situation and generalizes her observations. She defines 
her observations using terms such as “European lifestyle” and 
generalizes the behavior of the people partying in the context of 
arrival. Her “I” with its impulsive power says “No” and she decides 
not to assimilate into the situation but to adopt interpretation 
frameworks of “virtue”, as she calls it. Later on in interview, 
she specifies that these interpretation frameworks of virtue are 
linked with religion and the values which Hayet is familiar with 
because of her socialization in the context of origin. Following 
her experiences in the context of arrival, she decides to wear 
a scarf – against her husband’s wishes – and to become a real 
and conscious Muslim believer, as she defines it. Unlike Faysal’s 
and Caven’s, her process of emotional reflexivity leads to her 
not changing or cognitively influencing her own emotions. She 
decides to re-activate interpretation frameworks and norms that 
are linked to her religion and her belief in Allah, and she uses 
them to stabilize herself. Hence, not influencing her emotions 
cognitively – thus being emotionally passive in a way – enables 
her to behave in opposition to the perceived norms in the context 
of arrival on a level of action. She describes the effects as primarily 
positive: Hayet mentions inner calm, being free of fear, good 
feelings, self-confidence, calming down and coping with stress. 
The activation of spiritual-religious interpretation frameworks 
enables internal emotional passivity. And this emotional passivity 
(Katz, 1999) – not changing her own emotions but leaning on 
the power of Allah – leads to self-confidence through a level of 
action that goes along with different cultural framings. This allows 
Hayet to say “No” to behavior and norms which she cannot 
accept based on her different sociocultural background. Because 
of her emotional passivity (Katz, 1999) – allowing her emotions to 
happen with trust in God – she can be in an oppositional position 
and does not have to assimilate into areas she does not agree 
with. In that way, emotional passivity enables a form of agency 
which can be defined as opposition or resistance to norms in the 
context of arrival.
4.4.  Emotional passivity (“letting  
emotions arise”) leads to  
acceptance and passivity in  
terms of action level 
The Muslim religion and her belief in Allah are also very important 
to Lilia, who came from Tunisia with her husband who found 
work in Germany. Just like in Hayet’s case, spiritual-religious 
interpretation frameworks and practices like praying facilitate 
emotional passivity in her emotional reflexivity process. However, 
in her case, it leads to acceptance and passivity on an action 
level. In her in-depth-interview, Lilia speaks about a situation of 
discrimination in the context of arrival. One day she was in a car 
accident and the driver yelled at her afterwards.
Lilia: “But the police weren‘t nice either. Then I went to my 
doctor and cried and said: ‘It is like that, they think‚ scarf, 
that is maybe illiterate or something like that’, I don‘t know, 
then they can produce a bit of pressure or something. I think 
so, yes. Probably that is wrong, that I am wrong with that, 
yes. But I suppose it is like that, because once I was without 
the scarf and it was different. [...] So I actually try to be a 
bit friendly and nice, because Islam told us to be. I have 
a neighbor, and no matter what she says, I say ‘Yes and 
Amen’”. (Interview Lilia, Lines 613-625, highlighted text by 
the author)
Like Caven, Lilia tells of a situation of institutional discrimination 
and racism (e.g. Terkessidis, 2004). While reporting the accident 
she was not treated in a “nice” way by the police – even though 
she was the victim of the crash. She traces the unkind behavior of 
the driver and the German police back to wearing a scarf because 
there was a time when she did not wear it. At that time, she was 
not confronted with this kind of discrimination. Unlike Caven, 
she does not really believe that it is her “fault”, but she decides 
to call on Islam as a reason to be friendly and nice – even if she 
is confronted with discrimination and racism. She says “Yes and 
Amen”.
Lilia: “Yes, like I have already said, I believe in God very much, 
and eh (0.2) if I sometimes have trouble or stress, then I go 
for a prayer and say: ‘God, that is the problem, yes?’ That 
is really a bit like coping with stress, I would say.” (Interview 
Lilia, Lines 323-325, highlighted text by the author)
Lilia speaks about the process of emotional reflexivity she 
undergoes while praying. Drawing on Mead’s (1973) work, the 
internal dialogue between “I” and “Me” in the case of Lilia is 
accompanied by a third component: belief in Allah. She tells “God” 
about her problems and puts – as does Hayet – the responsibility 
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for the things happening in the mundane world in his hands. In 
this case, emotional reflexivity processes can take place through 
prayer, which fulfills the function of internal dialogues. Praying 
enables emotional passivity, allowing one’s own emotions to arise, 
which according to Katz (1999) is a very important aspect of 
emotion itself. The negative interactions with people experienced 
in the context of arrival triggered trouble and stress, which Lilia 
had to find a way to deal with. Lilia speaks about the effects of 
her internal dialogue, accompanied by the God she believes in: 
the emotional reflexivity process – the balancing of emotional 
activity and emotional passivity during prayer – leads to emotional 
passivity because she does not try to influence cognitively her 
emotions (Katz, 1999). Instead, she lets them happen and gives 
the responsibility to a higher power. She describes the effects 
as positive: the emotional passivity experienced is linked to 
coping with stress. In terms of her level of action, Lilia accepts 
the circumstances and is able to do nothing – even when facing 
situations of racist discrimination. Of course, one could raise the 
question of whether the acceptance of racism is maybe being 
too tolerant. 
5.  Conclusion: Agency  
as emotional reflexive  
agency
My analysis of emotional reflexivity processes in contexts of 
migration shows that there is more to emotional experience 
than emotional intelligence (Goleman, 2011) or emotion 
work (Hochschild, 1983). The concept of emotional reflexivity 
challenges the paradigm of rationality and emotional control: it 
shows that cost-value ratio as the only maxim for controlling 
emotions does not go far enough in contemporary societies. This 
is only one possibility of dealing with emotions. The concept of 
emotional reflexivity broadens this view: “Reflexivity is not just 
rational and involves rationalization; it is also relational, dialogical 
and emotional” (Burkitt, 2012, p. 471). More important still is 
how necessary emotional reflexivity seems to be in determining 
what to feel (Holmes, 2015). In circumstances where there are 
no clearly defined feeling rules and norms, according to Holmes 
(2015), emotions are needed for one to be able to navigate their 
own path.
The concept of emotional reflexivity shows that internal 
processes are indispensable interwoven with agency, which 
can be defined as the possibility and the ability to act. Internal 
processes influence people’s actions – or lack thereof – and 
therefore influence how society is designed. To further define 
these processes, the concept of emotional reflexivity will be 
an indispensable tool in future research because it broadens 
the analytical perspective on agency. By considering emotional 
reflexivity processes, it will be possible to observe the interplay 
and reciprocal influencing of material-embodied components 
and sociocultural framings (see Reckwitz’s (2012) definition of 
“affects”). Hence, it might be useful to use the term “emotional 
reflexive agency” in future research. Both internal processes to 
balance emotional passivity and emotional activity as well as 
passivity on an action level can be defined as a special kind of 
agency (Helfferich, 2012).
The empirical data has illustrated emotional reflexivity 
processes’ different results and their links to different forms of 
agency. In the cases of Faysal and Caven, it is clear that they 
decided to handle actively their emotions and influence them in a 
cognitively induced way: they cognitively tried to feel differently 
so that they could act in another way. Both were able to accept 
their circumstances. In Faysal’s case, he was able to accept the 
rainy weather in his new environment. Caven thought that, 
through cognitive control, he would be able to accept racist 
discrimination and calm himself down. Both described the 
cognitively induced influencing of their emotions as a kind of 
empowerment. However, from the perspective of Hochschild 
(1983), emotion work can lead to estrangement from one’s own 
feelings in the long run.
Hayet’s case differs from Faysal’s and Caven’s. Her process 
of emotional reflexivity did not lead her to alter her emotions. 
Hayet decided not to accept her new environment’s norms and 
feeling rules and instead focus on spiritual-religious interpretation 
frameworks taken from her socialization in her context of origin. 
This enabled her to be in a place of opposition and develop a 
different form of agency. This was possible because she adopted 
a state of emotional passivity and left responsibility for mundane 
events in the hands of a higher power, namely Allah. 
This is exactly what Lilia does, but with a different outcome: 
in her prayers, which can be understood as internal dialogues 
accompanied by a God in whom she believes, Lilia delegates 
responsibility for what is happening to that higher power. Being 
emotionally passive – not trying to influence or change her own 
emotions cognitively – effectuates passivity in terms of level of 
action. This allows Lilia to accept even racist discrimination. Both 
Hayet and Lilia describe reliance on Allah as a coping mechanism. 
In Hayet’s case it leads to a kind of opposition; in Lilia’s, to 
acceptance.
The concept of emotional reflexivity gives differentiated 
insights into processes of integration or inclusion (Amelina, 2013). 
It shows that internal balancing has different effects on leves of 
action. It also illustrates the emotional challenges that are linked 
with racist discrimination. Research into migration and inclusion 
must analyze the challenges faced as a part of these processes 
in order to manage emotional ambivalences in the future (see 
also Amelina, 2013, p. 145). Therefore, the concept of emotional 
reflexivity implies new analytical possibilities.
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